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Abstract: In this study, an experimental analysis of the fragility of the law of the comparative advantage 
in higher dimensions is performed. Noussair et al (1995) invoked a trading environment similar to the 2 x 
2 Competitive Ricardian Model (CRM) and observed the law of comparative advantage. In this 
experiment, the same experimental setting is invoked however the number of goods and countries is 
increased. There were three countries and three goods, two countries were categorised as ‘intermediate’ 
comparative advantage while one as ‘extreme’ comparative advantage. However, the Jones (1961)’s 
criterion for optimal assignment was satisfied. The experimental findings reveal the following (1) both 
the autarky model and the competitive model are rejected as a representation of the data but the 
competitive model performs better than the autarky model (2) the CRM does not predict the production 
pattern (3) the CRM does not predict pattern of trade (4) output prices do not converge to the prediction 
of the theoretical model. Thus the results support the claim of Deardoff (2005).  
 
Keywords: Competitive Ricardian Model; Comparative Advantage; Experiments; Trading Environment and 
Convergence.    
 
1. Introduction 
 
Noussair et al (1995) created an experimental environment motivated by the 2 x 2 Competitive Ricardian 
Model (CRM) and showed that the law of comparative advantage held in this setting. Deardorff (2005) 
argued that CRM generalises easily to either a two countries three goods setting or a three countries two 
goods setting. However, the comparative advantage does not hold when both number of countries and the 
number of goods are increased at the same time, for example in a three countries three goods setting. 
However, the generalisation to a three by three setting was illustrated by Jones (1961). He provided a 
complete specification of the patterns of specialisation and trade in the CRM with many goods and 
countries. He showed an efficient assignment* of countries to goods in a many-good, many-country CRM 
require minimisation of the product of countries’ unit labour requirements. Specialisation is associated 
with low unit labour requirements where “low” must be interpreted in comparison to other goods since 
the model requires that each country produce something, and thus contributes at least one of its labour 
requirements to one of these goods.  
 
The growing literature in experimental economics shows that market convergence generalise to a wide 
class of experimental economies, including those with multiple markets, small as well as large numbers of 
traders, robot traders or human traders, and markets with externalities. Although experimental 
economies converge towards equilibrium predictions, this process is not immediate. Convergence is 
achieved through a dynamic process that leads the variables in the economy towards equilibrium values. 
As experimental economies become more complex, the attainment of equilibrium becomes slower and 
less comprehensive. However, the equilibration process interacts with the specific interdependencies in 
different microeconomic structures to produce consistent and replicable results. There are many authors 
who have studied different complex environments including market interdependencies. Examples include 
Goodfellow and Plott (1990), who include production with derived demand; Chen and Plott (2002), who 
induced an exchange economy with two or more commodities; Lian and Plott (1998) who induce a small 
general equilibrium system with a circular flow of income; Noussair et al (2007) who created a large 
experimental environment to represent 3 countries trading in a perfectly competitive world; and 
Noussair and Powell (2008), who constructed experimental markets to observe behaviour of assets 
markets that experience a peak or trough in fundamentals.       
                                                        
* Jones (1961) defined an assignment as a pattern of complete specialisation and argued that there is a unique 
optimal assignment which is the one that lie on the world efficiency locus. An efficient/optimal assignment 
occurs when it is impossible to increase world output of any goods without reducing the output of at least one 
other good by moving labour from one assignment to the other.   
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In this paper, a 3 x 3 CRM which satisfy the optimal assignment condition is invoked. The trading model is 
operationalised in a laboratory setting. The laboratory world is divided into three countries where each is 
characterised by its own labour endowment and production technology. There are three output goods (X, 
Y and Z) which can be produced in any of the three countries at a predetermined rate. One input good, 
labour (L) is required to produce any of the outputs and reside in each of the three countries. Labour is 
immobile among countries. International trade occurs when output goods produced in one country are 
sold in the other two countries. Markets exist for all output goods (3 in each country) and all input goods 
(1 in each country). Thus, there are 12 markets in operation. There is no market for currencies as the 
exchange rate is set to 1. These markets will give an idea of the pattern of consumption, production and 
trade which occurs simultaneously in each country. Ultimately, the question that is addressed is: does the 
market system converges to the theoretical predictions when the Ricardian environment becomes more 
complex?  Hence, this experiment checks for the robustness of the law of comparative advantage when 
both the number of goods and countries are increased.    
         
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 explores in more details the 3 x 3 CRM which is invoked 
in the laboratory; Section 3 illustrates the experimental parameters; the theoretical predictions are given 
in Section 4; Section 5 describes the statistical methodology; the results are reported in Section 6; Section 
7 discusses efficiency. The conclusion is provided in section 8.    
 
2. Models 
 
3 x 3 Competitive Ricardian Model  
 
In the 3 x 3 CRM, there are three final goods, X, Y and Z which can be produced by a single input L. There 
are three countries which differ in their endowment of L. L, which is supplied in elastically, is mobile 
across sectors in a particular country but immobile across countries. The three countries are assumed to 
have different production function so that each has comparative advantage in the production of one of the 
goods. Assume that the constant labour costs of producing a unit of good j (j=X, Y, Z) in country i (i= 1, 2, 
3), i.e. aLj i are as follows: 
 
Table 1: Goods Triangle    
  Country  
  1 2 3 
Goods 
X aLX1                                           aLX 2 aLX 3 
Y  aLY 1 aLY 2  aLY 3 
Z aLZ 1  aLZ 2 aLZ 3 
 
In this case, how does one determine in which good country i has comparative advantage? Mckenzie 
(1954) was among the first to extend the CRM of trade to the case of many goods and countries. An 
efficient pattern of production must satisfy two conditions, first the bilateral comparisons for all possible 
pairings of goods and countries and second minimisation of the product of labour coefficient. Country 1 
will produce and export good X if the following bilateral comparison is satisfied: aLZ 1 / aLX 1   > aLZ 3 / aLX 3, 
i.e. it has bilateral comparative advantage in producing X compared to country 3 and aLY 1 / aLX 1   > aLY 2 / 
aLX 2, a comparative advantage in good producing good X compared to country 2. Country 2 will produce 
good Y if aLX 2 / aLY 2   > aLX 1 / aLY 1 and aLZ 2 / aLY 2   > aLZ 3 / aLY 3 and Country 3 will produce good Z as aLX 3 / 
aLZ 3   > aLX 1 / aLZ 1 and aLY 3 / aLZ 3   > aLY 2 / aLZ 2.  McKenzie (1954) illustrates the concept of bilateral 
comparative advantage through the ‘goods triangle’. Assume that the constant labour costs of producing a 
unit of j in i are as follows: 
 
Table 2: Comparative Advantage Goods Triangle 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Country  
Good 
 1 2 3 
X 1/4 1 2 
Y  1 1/3 1/2 
Z 1 1/2 1/3 
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One can use these to rank the bilateral comparative costs in three lines as shown in figure 1A where the 
numbers denote countries. If only Z and X are produced, then all countries produce Z. Country 1 has the 
highest bilateral comparative advantage in producing X relative to Z, next is country 2 whereas country 3 
has the lowest bilateral comparative advantage (1/4 < 2 < 3). If only X and Y are produced, country 2 has 
the highest bilateral comparative advantage in producing Y relative to X and country 1 has the least (1/3 
< 1/2 < 4). If only Y and Z are produced, then country 3 has the highest bilateral comparative advantage in 
Z relative to Y and country 2 the least (2/3 < 1 < 3/2). Thus, bilateral comparative advantage 
considerations reveal that country 1 will produce X, country 2 will produce Y and country 3 will produce 
Z.  
                                              
Figure 1A: 
 
  
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
These lines represent the edge of the goods triangle shown in figure 1B.   
 
 
Figure 1B: Goods Triangle 
 
In addition to satisfying bilateral comparative advantage, an efficient optimal assignment pattern 
minimises the product of labour coefficients. Jones (1961)’s criterion for optimal assignment is            
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Consider figure 1B, at the X-origin, assume there is an increase in demand for Y and Z at the expense of X. 
The ordering of countries along the borders of the good triangle indicates country 1 is the last country to 
transfer resources from production of X to Y and Z. Similarly, if demand for either good X and Z increases, 
at the expense of Y, country 2 is the last country to pull resources out of production of Y.  Country 3 is 
particularly good at producing Z in the sense that if demand for X and Y relative to  Z, country 3 is the last 
to move resources away from production of Z either X or Y. There are six possible assignments in which 
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three goods are produced and the efficient one has X produced by country 1, Y produced by 2 and Z 
produced by 3. In a competitive equilibrium, any commodity actively produced in a country must have 
unit labour costs equal to price so that profits are competed away. There is a simple general rule for 
locating the assignment that is efficient in its class. Reconsider the interior class in which each country is 
specialised completely to a different good. In the efficient specialisation, country 1 was assigned X, 
country 2 Y and country 3 Z, so that:  
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where wi is country i’s wage rate. It is also require that        
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If the assignment that X is produced by country 1, Y by 2 and Z by 3 is efficient/ optimal the product 
321
LZLYLX aaa  must not exceed 
321
LXLZLY aaa  as well as the product
321
LYLXLZ aaa . The first product is 1/36, 
the second 1/2 and the third 1/2. Therefore, the CRM model predicts that countries 1, 2 and 3 would 
produce exclusively X, Y and Z respectively and each of the three countries would be a net exporter of the 
good it produces. Several properties of figure 1B can be found in Jones (1985). This includes among 
others uniqueness of the optimal ‘internal’ assignments.   
 
Autarky Model  
 
Under autarky, goods are produced for home consumption only. The autarky model is useful because it 
characterises one benchmark of the potential behaviour a system might exhibit. There is no complete 
specialisation. All countries produce the three goods in different quantities, there are no international 
trade. However, the wage-price ratios are identical to that of the competitive model.  
 
3. Experimental Design  
 
Parameters  
 
A generalized CRM with three countries and three goods motivates the experimental environment. Trade 
in all markets followed the continuous double auction rules that were implemented through the MUDA 
software, details of which are available in Plott (1991) and Plott and Gray (1990). Table 1 shows the 
experimental parameters. A quadratic and additive separable utility function is assumed for both the 
consumers and producers†. The idea of separability is of fundamental importance. If utility is directly 
additive, then the marginal utility of any good varies with the quantity of that good alone. This 
representation of utility is also consistent with the goods being normal. In addition, given any income, the 
                                                        
† Assume that U (a) is well behaved if it is defined, strictly monotonic, and twice continuously 
differentiable on the nonnegative orthant a 0. Then, U (a) is additively separable if it can be written as  
2        ),(),.....()( 1 TxfaaUaU ttT   in an appropriate normalization. 
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ratio of the income elasticity to its price elasticity is taken to be constant. Further, it also makes it easy to 
determine redemption values of consumers. Each country has an equal number of producers and 
consumers and is endowed with a given amount of labour. Countries differ in their level of endowment 
and production technologies. Total endowment in each country is four times the amount listed in the 
table.   
 
The experiment consists of three “countries” (1, 2 and 3), three final goods: X, Y and Z - one factor, labour 
denoted by L. There are two types of agents in each country: Type C (Consumers) and Type P (Producers). 
Furthermore agents are divided equally among countries (4 each) and each has equal number of C and P 
agents. L is immobile among countries whereas X, Y and Z can be traded no matter where they are 
produced.   
 
Table 3: Experimental Parameters  
 
The market system works as follows: Type C are owners of L and have induced preferences for 
consuming X, Y and Z. So they sell L to Type P in their respective country and then buy units of X, Y and Z 
in any country. Type P traders buy L from Type C in their own countries. Then, they use L to produce X, Y 
and Z, according to their respective production schedule, which they sell to consumers in all three 
countries. Type C traders get utility from consumption of goods X, Y and Z and from profits made in 
market activities. Any units of X, Y and Z bought by Type C agents are assumed to be consumed. The 
redemption value sheet determines the amount Type C agents receive through consumption and are 
given in Appendix 1.  For the first unit of X that Type C consumes in a trading period, he/she receives the 
amount listed on his/her Redemption Value Sheet ( In this case 600, first row in the X unit value column ). 
Type P gain utility from production /trading activities only. Any units of L not used to produce goods 
X/Y/Z are worthless to Type P agents. Similarly any unit of X, Y and Z not sold is valueless.  
 
Market transactions (i.e. buying and selling) in the experimented were done using an experimental 
currency namely ‘franc’. To facilitate trading, each subject was given 100,000 francs at the start of each 
experiment. At the end of the experiment subjects were paid according to a conversation rate‡.   At the 
end of each period, subjects filled a Record Sheet to record the profit made in a particular period. Type P’s 
record sheet consists of one section, trading which is the cash on hand at the end of the period minus the 
cash on hand at the beginning of the period.  Type C’s record sheet consists of two sections, trading and 
consumption. Consumption records the units consumed and earnings made from those units consumed. 
Total profits are given by net change in cash on hand and total earnings made from consumption.   
 
Figure 2 shows the operation of the market system. The upper part shows the circular flow in country 2, 
the lower left and the lower right show the circular flows of countries 1 and 3 respectively. Output 
markets were numbered 1 to 9. Markets 1/2/3 denote market X/Y/Z in country 1. Markets 4/5/6 denote 
                                                        
‡ The conversation rate was 3000 francs to £ 1 for some experiments and 4000 francs to £ for other 
experiment.  
Preferences:     
Country 1  Country 2 Country 3 
U (X, Y, Z) = 600X- 45 X2 + 720Y- 45Y2 + 840Z- 45Z2    
Endowments of input factor (L):      
Consumers    2 3 4 
Producers    1 1 1 
Number:       
Consumers    2 2 2 
Producers    2 2 2 
Total Endowment   6 8 10 
Production    X=4L X=L X=L 
   Y=L Y=3L Y=2L 
      Z=L  Z=2L Z=3L 
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market X/Y/Z in country 2. Markets 7/8/9 denote market X/Y/Z in country 3. Markets 10/11/12 denote 
labour market in countries 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Trade occurs when output goods are sold to agents in 
countries where production of these output goods did not take place and since labour is immobile among 
countries, this implies market restrictions are as follows:  
 
Country 1- Type C: Market 11 and 12; Type P – Market 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12. 
Country 2- Type C: Market 10 and 12; Type P – Market 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12. 
Country 3- Type C: Market 10 and 11; Type P – Market 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11. 
 
Figure 2: The Market System 
 Country 2 
Type C                                                        Type P                                                                  
                                                   
                                     Market 11 (L = 3)                 Market 11 (L = 1)   
 
 
 
                  
 
 
                                                                             X                Y                 Z 
                                                                    Market 4     Market 5      Market 6    
Country 1                           Country 3 
Type C                                   Type P                                                                     Type P                          Type C 
                                   
Market 10 (L = 2)     Market 10 (L =1)                                                          Market 12 (L=1)          Market 12 (L= 4) 
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Procedures  
 
Five experiments (Experiment 1- Experiment 5) were conducted in the CeDEx laboratory at the 
University of Nottingham. The experiments involve 12 subjects (4 in each country). Subjects were 
undergraduates from the University of Nottingham. Most were non - economics students.  Subjects had 
training in the use of MUDA prior to the experiment, for which they were paid a fixed fee of £5. Subjects 
were not allowed to participate in more than one experiment. Each experiment was divided into 5 
periods of 10 minutes. Once assembled for the first time, subjects were randomly assigned as either Type 
C agents or Type P agents and kept the same role over subsequent periods. Instructions were given to 
both types. The instructions consisted of eight sections. These gave information about: subject’s type and 
number of goods in the computerized market; information about endowment and cash on hand; the 
operation of the market system; information about the production schedule and redemption values; 
information about trading profits, earnings and market restrictions. Full details of these instructions are 
given in Appendix 2. Basic information about MUDA included how to buy/ sell units, what numbers in the 
boxes meant and transformation. The first period of Experiment 1 was a practice session where 
accounting records were checked carefully for errors and subjects were reminded of the production and 
consumption process. In later periods and sessions spot checks were undertaken to verify accounting 
information. Subjects were also asked to check changes in cash on hand, endowments and contract 
history of the experiment using several keystrokes. The redemption values and production schedule were 
the same for each period; subjects received new endowments at the beginning of each period.  
 
   Produce 
    Produce   Produce 
SELL X, Y AND Z TO 
TYPE C IN ALL 
COUNTRIES 
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4. Theoretical Predictions 
 
Predictions about two environments are made namely: the autarky environment where countries only 
produce for self- consumption and the trading environment based on the 3 x 3 CRM.  
 
The Competitive Ricardian Environment  
 
If trade occurs among the three countries, given labour endowments, comparative advantage dictates that 
country 1 produces and exports only X, country 2 produces and exports only Y and country 3 produces 
and exports Z. Substituting labour endowment of X, Y and Z of country 1, 2 and 3 in their respective 
production function gives total production. The utility function is differentiated to get marginal utilities of 
each good, from which the aggregate demand for the whole system can be obtained and thus free trade 
prices. Input prices equal their marginal revenue. Net exports are derived from the excess demand 
equations in each country evaluated at the competitive prices. The theoretical derivations are available 
upon request from the author. 
               
   Table 4: CRM Predictions         
  Variables  Country 1  Country 2 Country 3  
Production        
X 24 - - 
Y  - 24 - 
Z - - 30 
Export        
X 16 - - 
Y  - 16 - 
Z - - 20 
Prices        
X 240 - - 
Y  - 360 - 
Z - - 390 
L  960 1080 1170 
   
The Autarky Environment  
 
In this environment, ach country produces all 3 goods. Prices of all goods would be different in the three 
countries and. Also, there are no payments-imbalances such that the total expenditure spent on goods X, Y 
and Z is equal to the total income earned by labour. The derivation of the predictions for the autarky 
environment is derived in a similar manner as the CRM.   
 
Table 5: Autarkic Predictions  
Variables  Country 1  Country 2 Country 3  
Production        
X 12 1 2 
Y  1.5 12 6 
Z 1.5 6 15 
Prices        
PX  60 615 510 
PY    652.5 180 450 
PZ   772.5 570 145 
 PLX  240 615 510 
 PLY                            652.5 540 900 
PLZ  772.5 570 4950 
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Efficiency 
 
Efficiency measures the extraction of social surplus. Following, Smith (1962), efficiency of a market is 
calculated as the total profit earned by all agents as a percentage of the maximum total profit that could 
be earned if trading occurred at equilibrium. In this case, the market system is 100 % efficient in a given 
period if and only if competitive equilibrium is attained. To calculate the level of efficiency in a particular 
period, the total profits made by both Type C and Type P traders in this particular period as a proportion 
of the competitive equilibrium profit are compared.      
 
Based on the theoretical predictions, the following hypotheses are tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The competitive model is an accurate representation of the general data 
Hypothesis 2: Aggregate production patterns converge to the predictions of the CRM. 
Hypothesis 3: The law of comparative advantage accurately predicts trade pattern 
Hypothesis 4: Individual consumption converges to the predictions of CRM. 
Hypothesis 5: Output prices converge towards the predictions of CRM.   
Hypothesis 6: Input / Output price ratio converges toward the marginal physical product.    
 
5. Statistical Methodology   
 
There are many different definitions of price/quantity convergence in the double auction literature4. In 
this experiment, it is important to account for within and across period changes as the CRM is a static 
equilibrium model whereas the data are generated by a dynamic process.  To check for convergence in 
the variable of interest, the following simple statistical dynamic model, called Ashenfelter-El-Gamal model 
used first in Noussair et al. (1995), is invoked.  
  Ait is the variable of interest in period t for experiment i, i = 1….n. Di are dummy variables that take a 
value of 1 for experiment i, and 0 otherwise. The random error uit is distributed normally with zero mean. 
Assume the variable of interested in production of Y; when t = 1, production of Y in experiment i equals 
B1i which can be interpreted as the initial production of Y for experiment i. However, its impact reduces 
over time, as 
t
1
tends toward zero e when t increases. Compared to B1i, when t increases the impact of 
B2 increases as 
t
t 1
gets larger. Thus, the coefficient B2 can be interpreted as the common asymptote 
of the variable production of Y.  To observe strong convergence of variable Ait, it suffices to test whether 
or not the estimates of B2 are significantly different from the predictions of the model. If not, it is said that 
the variable is strongly converging to the predicted values. However, as pointed out by Noussair et al 
(1995), weak or partial convergence can also be observed. Weak convergence is present if B2’s are 
quantitatively closer to the predictions than B1i. Since the number of experiments is 5, the model is: 
 
6. Results 
           
At the end of each experiment, a series of input and output prices are generated. These include ask prices, 
bid prices and contract prices. Figures 3 (a), (b) and (c) show the output contract time series for countries 
1, 2 and 3 respectively. Figures 4 (a, b and c) shows the input contract time series for countries 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. The data are from Experiment 3.    
                                                        
4 For example, Gode and Sunder (1993) argue that convergence occurs if the final market price is closer to the 
predicted price than early price. According to Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998), convergence occurs if, after several 
periods, the mean deviation of all trades from equilibrium is small.       
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 Figure 3: Output Price Time Series- Experiment 3  
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                                                               (c) 
 
 
 
Price- Market Y  
0 
120 
240 
360 
480 
600 
720 
0 605 1210 1815 2420 3025 3630 
Clock in Sec  
Price 
Competitive 
Equilibrium   
 Autarky  
Equilibrium  
Price- Market X  
0 
120 
240 
360 
480 
600 
720 
0 605 1210 1815 2420 3025 3630 
Clock in Sec 
Price 
Competitive  
Equilibrium  
            Autarky  
          Equilibrium  
Price- Market Z  
0 
195 
390 
585 
780 
0 605 1210 1815 2420 3025 363
Clock in 
Price 
Competitive  
Equilibrium  
Autarky  
Equilibrium  
 160 
 
Figure 4: Input Price Time Series- Experiment 3 
 
(a) 
                                                                                                                                      
(b) 
 (c)  
The x-axis denotes time measured in sec and gives the exact second of accepted bids or asks. The y-axis 
denotes prices. The vertical lines show the beginning and end of each period. The first line shows the 
beginning of the first period whereas the second denotes the end of period one. The gap between two 
lines shows the time interval between the end of a period and start of another. Nothing happens during 
this interval and subjects filled their record sheets. Spot checks were also undertaken. Although all 
observed contract prices do not automatically clustered towards the competitive equilibrium, there is an 
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indication of convergence in some markets. In later periods of the experiment, prices in market X and Y 
(figure 3) (b) and (c)) converge towards the competitive equilibrium. Prices in market Z experience slight 
convergence to the competitive equilibrium in period 5. Compared to outputs prices, input prices have a 
tendency to be both below the competitive equilibrium for country 2 and 3 whereas there is slight 
indication of convergence in the case of country 1. From the experiment 3 it is concluded that there is 
tendency for the competitive equilibrium price to be a better predictor in output than in input markets.  
 
Table 6: Convergence Patterns over time Production, Exports and Market Prices  
 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
Y = B11 D1 1/t + ......................B15 D5 1/t + B2 (t-1)/t + u   
B11  B12   B13  B14     B15  B2 
Competitive 
Equilibrium  
Autarky 
R2 
        Predictions Sig Predictions  Sig  
Production:              
Country 1             
X 12.55 15.28 22.39 14.19 17.37 19.23 24 Ns 12 <0.001 0.62 
  4.94 2.37 4.73 4.97 4.16 2.08       
Y 0.64 0.87 0.95 1.18 0.7 0.37 0 Ns 1.5 <0.001 0.57 
  0.98 0.45 0.39 0.52 0.84 0.27       
Z 0.68 0.72 1.02 1.25 1.02 0.23 0 Ns 1.5 <0.001 0.66 
  0.87 0.78 0.24 0.71 0.24 0.23       
Country 2             
X 1.6 2.7 0.14 0.56 0.12 0.39 0 Ns 1 <0.05 0.62 
  1.7 3.56 0.52 1.55 0.54 0.53       
Y 11.73 9.99 9.68 8.87 17.41 13.93 24 < 0.001 12 ns 0.57 
  9.17 3.04 6.67 8.67 2.56 2.14       
Z 3.76 3.44 4.67 5.67 6.03 4.42 0 < 0.001 6 ns 0.66 
  0.87 1.87 2.37 4.64 5.59 1.06       
Country 3             
X 2.27 0.26 0.2 0.48 0.054 0.55 0 Ns 2 <0.05 0.6 
  2.01 0.76 0.63 1.35 0.3 0.34       
Y 0.18 6.54 1.89 2.14 2.37 7.1 0 < 0.001 6 ns 0.81 
  4.96 1.6 1.5 0.94 1.38 1.27       
Z 18.39 15.04 25.43 14.67 24.71 18.82 30 < 0.001 15 ns 0.93 
  9.86 8.32 5.11 7.3 6.3 2.69       
Net Exports:              
X 7.9 4.23 8.19 4.47 7.2 13.24 16 Ns 0 <0.05 0.62 
  10.8 2.64 7.6 4.27 3.65 2.14       
Y 1.65 3.56 1.9 8.16 13.97 7.74 16 < 0.001 0 <0.05 0.57 
  4.02 4.11 3.31 5.13 1.63 1.85       
Z 1.65 11.49 18.97 9.23 19.17 10.14 20 < 0.001 0 <0.05 0.66 
  3.86 4.45 1.68 1.1 2.44 1.46       
Market Prices:              
Country 1             
X 508.06 526.07 448.6 440.8 286.3 327.2 240 < 0.001 60 <0.05 0.9 
  88.2 88.01 30.64 39.2 99.4 23.5       
L 2069.7 1501.6 1074.6 465.7 664.7 794.9 960 Ns 240 <0.05 0.66 
  1850 349.4 563.6 571 190 250       
Country 2             
Y 855.64 852.55 486.35 418.53 313.1 491.1 360 <0.05 180 <0.005 0.82 
  92.32 521.96 63.7 75.36 61.79 62.45       
L 1369 1591.6 464.6 576.59 584.3 801.8 1080 <0.05 540 <0.05 0.86 
  640.29 222.94 204.0 205.76 103.09 117.25       
Country 3             
Z 1074.7 505.98 323.84 388.51 333.6 476.7 390 <0.05 165 <0.001 0.89 
  428.47 38.66 98.72 80.79 73.93 44.86       
L 3364.8 1484.3 789.8 635.9 833.7 969.5 1170 Ns 495 <0.005 0.91 
  547.04 119.51 122.28 158.53  129.85  154.81           
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Result 1: Both the autarky model and the competitive model are rejected as a representation of the data 
but the competitive model performs better than the autarky model.        
 
Table 6 reports the estimates of the parameters of the econometric model described in section 5 for 
production, net export and market prices respectively.  Estimates of the origin of each experiment, as 
captured by B1i, are reported as well as the common asymptote (captured by B2) for each variable. 
Standard errors, given in italics, are corrected for heteroscedasticity (to account for stabilization, which 
would decrease the variance of the error terms for later periods in the sessions) as well as serial 
correlation. R2 is also reported for each equation. The sig column give the significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected, ns denotes non-significant. The null hypothesis being the asymptote of a 
particular variable is the same as its theoretical prediction. This hypothesis cannot be rejected. The 
hypothesis that a variable converges to its competitive equilibrium cannot be rejected if the B2 is not 
statistically different from the predicted value. The models are accepted as appropriate representations 
of the data if sig for all the variables are non-significant (ns). 
 
Predictions are made for 12 quantity variables and for 6 price variables. For the competitive model, B2 is 
not statistically different from the predicted value in 8 cases out of 18. The autarky model on the other 
hand succeeds to predict 4 variables out of the 18. Thus, both the autarky model and the competitive 
model are rejected as a representation of the data but the competitive model performs considerably 
better than autarky.        
 
Result 2: The CRM does not predict production patterns.   
   
The CRM predicts that country 1 will devote all its endowments to production in sector X. Thus, country 1 
will not produced either Y or Z at any particular time. From table 4, production of X in country 1 as 
captured by B2 is 19.2 units compared to 24. A test of significance revealed that the hypothesis that the 
asymptote, B2 is statistically different form the predicted value cannot be reject ted. This indicates proof 
of strong convergence.  
 
From table 6, it can be deduced that as more experiments are carried out production of Y and Z inclined 
towards zero. B1i’s are nearer to zero in later experiments indicating presence of weak convergence. 
Furthermore, there is also strong convergence; B2’s are not statistically different from zero. Compared to 
the CRM, the autarky model performed badly. There are sign of neither strong nor weak convergence 
when it comes to production of X, Y and Z. The asymptotes of the production variables are significantly 
different from the predicted values of the autarky model. At p< 0.001, the null hypothesis that the 
asymptote B2’s is similar to the predictions of the autarky model is rejected. From these two observations, 
the conclusion is that the CRM predicts the pattern of production in country 1.  
 
From table 6, there is no evidence of strong convergence in production of Y and Z for country 2. B2’s are 
statistically different from the equilibrium values. Production of Y is 13.93 units as opposed to 24 units 
and production of Z is 4.42 units as opposed to zero. At p< 0.001, the null hypothesis that the asymptote 
B2’s is similar to the predictions of the CRM model is rejected. Similarly, B1i are quantitatively closer to the 
predicted value indicating absence of weak convergence. Similar conclusions are reached when 
production in country 3 is considered. Production of Y is 7.1 units as opposed to zero and production of Z 
is 18.82 as opposed to 30 units. However, the CRM accurately predicts the level of production of good X in 
both countries. Based on the t-test conducted, there is evidence of strong convergence. The hypothesis 
that production in later periods converges towards zero cannot be rejected at p< 0.001 level of 
significance. Surprisingly, the autarky model is a better predictor for production of Y and Z in countries 2 
and 3. Thus, there is proof of strong convergence. In country 2, production of Y is 13.93 units as opposed 
to 12 and production of Z is 4.42 units as opposed to 6. In country 3, production of Y is 7.1 units as 
opposed to 6 and production of Z is 18.82 units as opposed to 15.   
 
Result 3: The law of comparative advantage fails to predict the pattern of trade. 
 
With reference to table 4, the observed value of net exports of good X is 13.24 as opposed to 16 units. 
Statistically, the asymptote of net exports of good X is not different from the prediction of the CRM. Table 
4 also reveals that B1i > B2 (for i = 3 to 5) indicating that the regression line is negatively sloped and 
experiment i converges from above. Thus, the flow of international trade is not only in the direction 
predicted by comparative advantage but the magnitude is converging to the predicted value of the 
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competitive environment. Result 2 and 3 suggest that the pattern of production and trade are consistent 
with the directions predicted by the CRM for country 1.   
 
From Result 2, the inference that the CRM predicted production quantities for countries 2 and 3 are not 
consistent with the observed asymptote values. From table 4, net exports of Y and Z are respectively 7.74 
and 10.14 units compared as opposed to 16 and 20. The null that the observed values are similar to the 
predicted value is rejected at p<0.001, indicating no evidence of strong convergence. Similarly, no 
evidence of weak convergence is found. Results 2 and 3 indicate that the CRM fails to predict both 
production and net export quantities for countries 2 and 3.  
 
McKenzie (1954) and Jones (1961) show that when the dimensionality of goods and countries in the CRM 
is increased, countries will produce and export those goods where the bilateral comparisons of unit 
labour coefficient holds for all possible pairings of goods and the product of the labour requirement in 
efficient assignment of goods must be less that the corresponding product of all possible assignments that 
allocate the same number of countries to each commodity as the efficient assignment. In this case, this 
generalization implies that country 1 will produce and export good X; country 2 will produce and export Y 
and country 3 will produce and export Z. The results obtained reveal existence of complete specialisation 
for good X but not for good Y and Z.  Similarly, while country 1’s net exports of X are in accordance with 
the predictions of the CRM this is not the case for net exports of Y and Z.  
 
Result 4: Individual Consumption of X, Y and Z converge to the predicted values of the CRM.   
 
Table 7: Average Individual Consumption  
 Period  
     Good  1 2 3 4 5 
X 2 2.9 2.9 2.5 3.2 
Y  1.7 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.8 
Z 3.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.6 
 
Table 7 gives the average individual consumption per period. It can be seen that individual consumption 
in Period 5 is higher than in other periods. However, individual consumption in any period is not equal to 
the theoretical prediction of 4, 4 and 5 units of goods X, Y and Z respectively. The mean deviation and 
standard deviation statistics are used to analyze individual consumption patterns, computed as:  
 
Mean Deviation:
i
rr
N
xx )ˆ(
; Standard Deviation:  
i
rr
N
xx 2)ˆ(
   where xr denotes 
actual consumption of agent r; rxˆ denotes competitive equilibrium consumption of agents r and N is the 
number of observation (consumers times experiments), thus  N = 30.  
 
Table 8 reports values of these for the five periods. Individual consumptions in period t are pooled across 
experiments and the difference between the observed and predicted consumption value for period t (t = 
1…5) computed for goods X, Y and Z. In this way one can observed whether individual consumption levels 
converge to the equilibrium consumption values as period j is replicated.     
 
Table 8: Deviations of Individual’s Holding from CRM Predictions (by period) 
  Period  
Output Statistics  1 2 3 4 5 
X  
Mean Deviation  -2 -1.07 -1.1 -1.47 -1.08 
Standard Deviation  4.75 3.33 3.02 3.41 1.9 
Y 
Mean Deviation  -2.3 -2.8 -2.6 -2.5 -1.16 
Standard Deviation  5.24 6.46 5.9 5.7 2.74 
Z 
Mean Deviation  -1.93 -2.7 -2.63 -2.56 -1.43 
Standard Deviation  4.85 6.14 5.96 5.9 3.7 
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Evidence of convergence requires that the absolute value of the mean deviations and standard deviation 
in later periods are smaller than that of the early periods. From table 6, the mean deviation of period 5 is 
1.08, 1.16 and 1.43 for X, Y and Z respectively, the lowest of all observed periods. Furthermore, the mean 
deviation from the competitive value falls consistently over the first three periods for X and the second 
four periods for Y and Z. Standard deviations fall consistently over the first three periods for X and the 
second four periods for Y and Z. Standard deviations of later periods are lower than early periods, falling 
consistently for good Y and Z. The hypothesis that the absolute deviations for the early period are smaller 
or equal to that of late periods (period 3-5) can be accepted at the 5% level of significance, providing 
support for convergence towards the individual competitive equilibrium consumption level.  
 
Result 5: Output prices are not converging toward the competitive equilibrium.   
 
From table 4, it is observed that the asymptote of price of X is 327.2 francs. Thus, evidence of strong 
convergence as B2’s are statistically different from the predictions of the CRM model is not found. Also, 
there is no evidence of weak convergence. Similar observations are made for prices of Y and Z at the 5% 
level of significance. The observed asymptote of price of Y is 491.1 francs. As such, B2 is statistically 
different from the CRM prediction of 360 francs. The asymptote of price of Z is 476.7 francs. It does not 
tend to converge towards the equilibrium of 390 francs. Also, there is no indication of weak convergence 
in either price of Y or Z.  Thus, there is non-existence of price convergence toward the competitive 
equilibrium.    
 
Result 6: Input/ Output prices ratios are below the marginal revenue product. 
 
As pointed out by Noussair et al (1995), determinations of input prices are more complex because of the 
nature of derived demand. As such, deviation of input prices from the competitive equilibrium is not only 
due to a lack of equilibrium in the output market; but the factors have their own independent dynamic 
adjustment.  Under the CRM conditions it is expected input prices to equal output prices multiplied by the 
marginal physical product, which is a constant as technologies are linear. It means that the ratio of factor 
price to output price, when compared to the marginal physical products, can then be used to determine 
whether the input conditions are satisfied.  
 
Table 9: Convergence Patterns Input/Output Price Ratios  
  Y = B11 D1 1/t + ......................B15 D5 1/t + B2 (t-1)/t + u   
Dependent 
Variables  B11  B12   B13  B14     B15  B2 
Competitive 
Equilibrium  Autarky  R2 
        Predictions Sig Predictions  Sig    
Country 1             
PL/Px 5.09 2.8 2.37 0.92 2.26 2.48 4 ns 4 ns 0.62 
  9.97 2.5 0.85 1.23 1.59 1.31       
Country 2             
PL/PY 1.77 2.84 0.98 1.5 1.84 1.59 3 < 0.05 3 <0.05 0.88 
  2.45 1.7 0.717 0.58 0.41 0.38       
Country 3             
PL/PZ 4.1 2.88 2.36 1.63 2.37 2.13 3 < 0.05 3 <0.05 0.92 
  1.38 0.26 0.78 0.2 0.32 0.28       
 
Table 9 reports estimates of the time path of ratios of output to input prices. An econometric model of the 
same form as described in section 5.4 is estimated. The B1i in this case measures the ratio during the first 
period which is permitted to differ among experiments. B2 measures the asymptote of each ratio as time 
goes to infinity. Evidence of convergence requires that B2 is not statistically different from the ratio of 
factor price to output price. Thus there is evidence of strong convergence for country 1 as B2 is not 
statistically different from the ratio of factor price to output price. Neither strong nor weak evidence are 
found for countries 2 and 3.  
 
A similar relationship was found in the economies studied by Noussair et al (1995). This relationship also 
emerged in the laboratory economy created by Riedl and Van Winden (2001). Noussair et al (1995) give 
the Risk Compensated Input/ Output Price Adjustment Property as an explanation of this observation. 
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Unlike the consumers, producers do not have a cost sheet to give them an idea about the reservation price 
they should pay for the labour they bought. This implies that they do not have a prior idea about the price 
they will change for the final product. Thus, they face a risk. To compensate for this risk, producers 
earned a premium over the amount they will earn in the competitive equilibrium. Although there is 
evidence of strong convergence in the case of country 2 and country 3, the observed marginal physical 
products tend to be lower than the predicted value as the number of periods increase, hence it can argue 
that this property is also present in countries 2 and 3.  
 
7. Efficiency 
    
Finally, to calculate the level of efficiency in a particular period, a comparison of the total amount of 
profits made by both Type C and Type P traders as a percentage of the maximum profit that can be earned 
at competitive equilibrium is done.  
 
Observation 1:  Efficiency is higher in later sessions than earlier  
 
Market efficiency for the pooled data is reported in Figure 5. Efficiency in early periods is lower than that 
of late periods. Efficiency in periods 1-3 averaged 61.6% whereas efficiency in periods 4-5 averaged 
70.3%. Efficiency level in period 5 is 76.6%.  
                              
Figure 5: Market System Efficiency 
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8. Conclusions 
   
The generalisation of the CRM to a three by three setting was illustrated by Jones (1961). He provided a 
complete specification of the patterns of specialisation and trade in the CRM with many goods and 
countries. He showed an efficient assignment of countries to goods in a many-good, many-country CRM 
require minimisation of the product of countries’ unit labour requirements. Specialisation is associated 
with low unit labour requirements where “low” must be interpreted in comparison to other goods since 
the model requires that each country produce something, and thus contributes at least one of its labour 
requirements to one of these goods.  
 
Although the theoretical model satisfies this condition, the main conclusion of the experiments is that 
comparative advantage holds for trade patterns in one but not all countries. The competitive model is 
rejected as a representation of the experimental data. Convergence is present in 6 out of the 12 quantity 
variables and 2 out of the 6 price variables. There is no convergence (strong or weak) in output prices 
whereas there is also a tendency for factors of production to trade at prices below their marginal 
products. There is less support for the autarky model. While, Noussair et al (1995) observe comparative 
advantage motivated by the 2 x 2 CRM in a laboratory setting, the results reveal that when there is an  
increase the dimensionality from 2 x 2 to a 3 x 3, the laboratory data is not consistent with the law of 
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comparative advantage. As such, the robustness of comparative advantage is fragile when both the 
number of goods and countries are increased, at least in this laboratory setting.  
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Appendix 1: Redemption Values 
Consumer 1 Unit  X Unit X Total  Y Unit Y Total  Z Unit Z Total  
   Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  
 1 600 600 640 640 680 680 
 2 510 1110 550 1190 590 1270 
 3 420 1530 460 1650 500 1770 
 4 330 1860 370 2020 410 2180 
 5 240 2100 280 2300 320 2500 
 6 150 2250 190 2490 230 2730 
 7 60 2310 100 2590 140 2870 
 8 10 2320 10 2600 50 2920 
               
Consumer 2 Unit  X Unit X Total  Y Unit Y Total  Z Unit Z Total  
   Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  Value  
 1 555 555 595 595 635 635 
 2 465 1020 505 1100 545 1180 
 3 375 1395 415 1515 455 1635 
 4 285 1680 325 1840 365 2000 
 5 495 2175 235 2075 275 2275 
 6 105 2280 145 2220 185 2460 
 7 15 2295 55 2275 95 2555 
 8 5 2300 20 2295 50 2605 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Instructions-Type P/ Type C  
You are participating in an experiment of market decision making. The instructions are simple and if you 
follow them you can earn considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. In this 
experiment, we are conducting a market in which you will be designated as one of two types of traders: 
Type C or Type P. The experiment will run for 5 periods of 10 minutes each. You can find your type at the 
top of the instructions. You are classified as Type P and you are given a Record Sheet for each period of 
the experiment and a Production Schedule Sheet (these are on your desk). The Production Schedule Sheet 
will help you determine the value of any decision that you might make. This information is private to you 
and should not be revealed to anyone.  
 
There are 4 types of goods (one input and three outputs) which can be traded in these markets: W, X, Y 
and Z. You can make profits through trading of the goods. Unlike the practice session (practice 2) where 
you were allowed to buy and sell in the same market, here in each market you can either buy or sell but 
not both. When you move the order box between market you will see either F1-BUY if you are a buyer or 
F2-SELL if you are a seller. Trading in all markets is in terms of francs; however your final payoff will be 
in terms of pounds. Your conversion rate is 4000 francs to £1 (for every 4000 francs profits you make, 
you earn £1). You will be paid at the end of the experiment according to how much profit you make. In 
this handout it is explained how to calculate profits 
 
Endowments/ Cash on Hand 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 100000 francs cash on hand. At the beginning of each 
period, you will be given an endowment of W. This is the same for each period. However, you are free to 
buy more endowment from anyone who might want to sell it. 
 
How the System Works 
Type C traders are endowed with W but would like to consume X, Y and Z. They can sell W to Type P to 
increase their cash in order to buy X, Y and Z. Thus, Type C is a seller in market for W and buyer in market 
for X, Y and Z. Type P traders are also endowed with W, but they may purchase units of W from Type C 
traders in order to produce. They can produce X, Y, Z from W and sell them to Type C traders to increase 
their cash on hand. Thus, Type P is a buyer in market for W and seller in market for X, Y and Z.  
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Specific instructions to type p  
Production  
During each market period, you are free to buy as many units of W which you use to produce and sell 
units of X, Y and Z from units of W. Production is done by using the transformation key F4 (as you were 
shown in practice training session). When producing units of X, Y and Z, you have to use the table labelled 
Production Schedule. This table reflects the number of units of X/ Y and Z that you can produce from 
given amounts of W for the whole period. You have already been instructed in how to read the production 
schedule, but the following example may remind you further. Note that you have to fill the transformation 
box (F4) based on the production schedule.    
 
Production Schedule (for Production Decision) 
 
 
           Units of W (Input)                 1      2       3       4       5        6      7       8        9     10      
  
           Units of X (Output)                    6       4        2     1        0       0       0       0       0       0         
          
 
           Total Output                       6      10     12     13     13    13     13    13     13    13 
 
 
 
 
           Units of W (Input)               1      2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9      10  
  
           Units of Y (Output)              5      3       2       1       0       0       0       0       0       0 
          
 
           Total Output                         5       8     10     11     11     11    11     11     11    11 
 
 
 
 
          Units of W (Input)                 1       2      3       4       5       6       7       8      9       1 0  
  
         Units of Z (Output)                7       5      4       2       0        0      0       0      0        0 
          
 
         Total Output                           7      12    16      18    18     18    18     18     18     18 
 
  
 
Suppose you have two units of W. Based on the above production schedule, you can produce one of these 
combinations: 
 
1. 10 units of X (first unit produces 6 and the second produces 4)  
2.    6 units of X and 5 units of Y  
3.    6 units of X and 7 units of Z  
4.    5 units of Y and 7 units of Z  
5.    8 units of Y (first unit produces 5 and the second produces 3)  
6.    12 units of Z (first unit produces 7 and the second produces 5)  
 
You make profit by selling those units of X/Y and Z produced to Type C traders. For example assume you 
produce 1 unit of X (using 1 unit of W) which is sold to Type C trader at 180. If the purchase price of W 
was 150, then you make a per-unit profit of 180- 150 =30.  Thus, your profit on par unit sold is (Selling 
price- Cost [Buying price of W]. 
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Trading Profit 
You can earn profit through trading and consumption.  Selling increases your cash on hand by the amount 
of total sales revenue. Buying decreases your cash in hand by the value of purchases.  
 
Earnings 
Your profit per period is equal to: 
 
(Cash in hand at the end of the period) – (Cash in hand at the beginning of the period)  
 
At the end of each period you must complete a record sheet.  
 
Record Sheet 
Period No:  
Trading  
 
(1) Cash on hand at end of the period 
 
(2) Cash on hand at beginning of period 
 
(3) Net Change in cash on hand (1) – (2)  
 
Total Profits for the Period  
In line (1) fill the cash on hand at the end of the period. In line (2) fill the cash on hand at the beginning of 
the period. Line (3) is simply line (1) minus line (2) which is your net change in cash on hand and also 
your total profits for the period.    
 
Market Restrictions 
Some of you may not be able to trade in all markets. You may not trade in Market No: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12   
  
Specific instructions to type c 
 
Consumption 
During the experiment you are free to sell as many units as you wish of W and buy as many units of X, Y 
and Z as you wish. Each unit of X, Y and Z you buy is assumed to be consumed by you.  
Your Redemption Value sheet determines the amount you receive through consumption. You have 
already been instructed in how to read the redemption value sheet in the practice session. For the first 
unit of X that you consume for a given  trading period, you receive the amount listed on your Redemption 
Value Sheet – the first row in the X unit value column (500, for example). For the second unit of X that you 
consume, you receive the amount listed in second row of the X unit value column (480 for example). The 
total amount that you receive from the consumption of both is found in the second column of X total value 
column (500 + 480 = 980). The amount you receive from consumption of Y and Z are found in a similar 
way by reading the final 4 columns. The redemption value you received from W is always zero. Whenever 
you trade you should take account of those redemption values. Your per unit profit is given by:  
(redemption value- purchase price).    
 
Redemption Value Sheet- in francs (for Consumption Decisions) 
 
        Unit       X unit     X total     Y unit     Y total    Z Unit         Z total   
 
        Value     Value       Value     Value      Value         Value 
 
         1            500         500 
 
2            480         980       
 
      3 
 
      4 
 
      5 
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Instructions to both types  
Trading profits 
You can earn profits through consumption and trading.  Selling increases your cash on hand by the 
amount of total sales revenue. Buying decreases your cash in hand by the value of purchases.  
 
Earnings 
Your profits per period exactly is equal to 
 
(Cash in hand at the end of the period) – (Cash in hand at the beginning of the period) + (Redemption 
value of units that you consume). 
  
At the end of each period you must complete a record sheet.  
 
 
Record Sheet 
Period No:  
Trading  
 
(1) Cash on hand at end of the period 
 
(2) Cash on hand at beginning of the period 
 
(3) Net Change in cash on hand (1) – (2)  
 
Consumption 
   
 (4) Units Consumed: X                + Y                   + Z                                   
 
Earnings from consumption 
 
(5)    X 
 
(6)    Y 
 
(7)    Z 
 
(8)   Total Earnings from consumption 
             (5) + (6) + (7)  
 
 
Total Profits for the Period: (3) + (8) 
 
Your record sheet is divided into two sections: Trading and Consumption. In line (1) fill the cash on hand 
at the end of the period. In line (2) fill the cash on hand at the beginning of the period. Line (3) is simply 
line (1) minus line (2). In line (4) enter the number of units that you consume of W, X, Y and Z. In line (5) - 
(7), fill in the earnings from the consumption X, Y and Z and Y based on your redemption values sheet.   In 
line (8) add the total of lines (5), (6) and (7). In line (9) add the total of line (3) and (8), this is your profit 
for the period (in francs). You should aim to maximise your profits since this value will determines your 
earnings at the end of the experiment.   
 
Market Restrictions 
 
Some of you may not be able to trade in all markets. You may not trade In Market 11 and Market 12. 
 
